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To the Editor: Since the Global Polio Eradication Initiative was launched in 1988, indigenous transmission of wild poliovirus (WPV) has been interrupted in all countries except Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria (1) . However, during 2003-2011, outbreaks resulting from importation of WPV occurred in 29 previously polio-free countries in Africa, including Central African Republic (CAR) (1) (2) (3) . In 2011, 350 WPV cases were reported from 12 countries in Africa, a 47% decrease from the 657 cases reported by 12 countries in Africa in 2010 (1) .
In CAR, the last case of poliomyelitis caused by indigenous transmission of wild poliovirus was reported in 2000, but importation of WPV type 1 has been reported (4 (6) (7) (8) . Cases were classified as laboratory confirmed or polio-compatible according to WHO recommendations; a polio-compatible case was defined as AFP for which stool samples were not adequate or a situation in which the patient was lost to follow up or had residual paralysis 60 days after testing.
Of 141 AFP cases from 2008, three, from Bangui, Ouham, and Ouaka districts, were laboratory confirmed as WPV1; this cluster was designated B2D1B (Figure) . Sequencing results showed that the virus in this cluster belonged to the South Asia A (Indian) genotype, which was circulating in Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo at that time ( Figure) .
Of 163 AFP cases from 2009, 14 in Ouham-Pende district were laboratory confirmed as WPV3; this cluster was designated D2B2B1. Sequencing results showed that the virus in this cluster belonged to West Africa B genotype, which was circulating in Nigeria and southern Chad at that time (Figure) .
Of 142 AFP cases from 2011, four in Ouham district were laboratory confirmed as WPV1; this cluster was designated I6C2B4C1A2. Sequencing results showed that the virus in this cluster belonged to West Africa B genotype, which was circulating in south Chad and Nigeria at the time (Figure) .
The importation of wild poliovirus strains into CAR appeared to follow The 2011 polio outbreak occurred in the district of Ouham and was caused by WPV1 poliovirus imported from southern Chad (Figure) . Fourteen additional cases of AFP were classified as polio-compatible; these occurred in Ouham-Pende (6), Ouham (1), Ombela M'Poko (1), Kemo (1), Ouaka (1), Haute Kotto (2), and Mbomou (2) districts. Routine OPV coverage for this insecure and difficult-to-access region was 55% for 2010 and 58% for 2011.
CAR is one of the countries with the highest predicted risk for WPV circulation after importation (9) . The 3 WPV importation events we report demonstrate that current immunization levels in this country are insufficient to guard against polio. High, sustained levels of routine OPV coverage in every district, supplemented by highquality supplementary immunization activities, will help prevent future outbreaks. Surveillance standards must also be maintained to ensure the rapid detection of WPV importation, thus enabling timely response and containment.
